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 Individual Welfare and the Demand
 for Financial Instruments*
 GEOFFREY A. JEHLE
 Vassar College
 Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
 I. Introduction
 A great deal of attention has been focused in recent years on the theory and practicability
 of partial equilibrium welfare analysis in markets for ordinary goods and services. This
 research has resulted in a better understanding of the theoretical relationship between
 product prices, incomes, and individual and social welfare, and in the specification of
 rigorous methodologies for theoretical and empirical analysis of the welfare aspects of
 policies affecting prices, market structures, and the availability of products.
 The markets for financial instruments, specifically the markets for credit and debt,
 have so far escaped careful scrutiny and have not benefitted equally from these advances in
 welfare theory. For certain purposes, it may be useful and proper to treat the markets for
 credit and debt as exactly analogous to ordinary goods and services markets. However, for
 the purposes of individual and social welfare analysis these markets deserve separate
 consideration. Agents' behavior in the markets for credit and debt reflect and largely
 summarize their intertemporal allocations of resources between ordinary goods and services
 markets in different time periods. Since welfare analysis of this market behavior must
 build upon the underlying structure of individuals' decision-making, and since this decision-
 making explicitly involves the dimension of time, the welfare analysis must also explicitly
 recognize and account for the role of time.
 What little attention welfare analysis of credit and debt markets has received, either
 directly or indirectly, has been largely confined to the banking literature where such
 problems as the relationship of interest rates on borrowing and lending to individual and
 social welfare are of obvious relevance to issues of banking regulation and banking market
 structure analysis. Typified in papers by Rhoades [9], Benston [1], and Policano [7], this
 work has been mostly empirical and has relied heavily on tenuous analogies drawn between
 ordinary markets and the markets for financial instruments. These analogies have been
 fundamentally ad hoc, and have been offered without explicit theoretical justification.
 This paper provides a solution to this problem which is both theoretically justifiable
 *This work is taken from the author's doctoral dissertation at Princeton University. I am grateful to Stephen
 Goldfeld, Dwight Jaffee, and Robert Willig for their advice and criticism. They bear no responsibility for any
 remaining errors.
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 and empirically useable. In section II, individuals' demands for financial instruments are
 derived from a generalized Fisherian intertemporal consumption model. These demands
 are expressed in terms of the future value of the borrowing and lending undertaken by the
 individual in the initial period of an arbitrary time horizon, and are dependent on their
 current period prices or discount rates. In section III an exact measure of the influence of
 these prices on individual welfare is constructed, observable surplus measures are defined
 which are analogous to ordinary consumer surplus, and the relationship of these observable
 surplus measures to the theoretically exact measure is specified. It is shown that with
 proper adaptation and interpretation, the entire spirit and substance of Willig's [11; 12]
 well-known solution to the problem of estimating individual welfare in ordinary markets
 can be carried over to the particular type of intertemporal decision-making which gives rise
 to market demands for financial instruments. Section IV illustrates how the observable
 surplus measures can be calculated from the usual interest rate and present value form
 which demands for financial instruments commonly take in theoretical and empirical
 work. Contrary to what appears to be generally presumed, the proper observable surplus
 measures which bear a clear and definite relationship to accepted theoretical measures of
 individual and social welfare are not properly calculated as simple areas under observable
 demands for financial instruments. However, it is shown that simple adaptations in the
 calculation of those areas suffice to enable definite and precise welfare calculations to be
 made. The final section illustrates how the theoretical methods constructed in the paper
 can be applied to calculate the welfare costs of bank mergers. Results of simple statistical
 tests challenge the conventional wisdom associating mergers that cause large increases in
 market concentration with large welfare losses to bank customers.
 II. The Model of Individual Behavior
 Individuals are assumed to possess a T + 1 period planning horizon over which they are
 currently prepared to make financing decisions. They are assumed to possess a preference
 ordering over commodities in the T+ 1 periods with the necessary properties to permit its
 representation at fixed commodity prices by a utility function U(Co, C1,..., CT) that is
 continuous, twice-differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly quasiconcave in consump-
 tion levels Ck, k = 0,..., T. The individual is endowed with initial wealth w and expects
 future incomes yi,..., yr with certainty. Consumers are assumed to have access to an array
 of financial instruments with which to finance their intertemporal consumption plans
 which they contract for in the initial period. These instruments are partitioned into two
 groups: those that constitute obligations of the consumer to pay $1 in some future period,
 and those that represent the obligations of others to pay the consumer $1 in some future
 period. The former group, which will be called "loans," and the latter group called
 "deposits," are available in maturities of from one to T periods. Let Lk ? O, k = 1,..., T,
 be the total number of obligations to deliver $1 at the beginning of period k which the
 consumer sells, and let Dk ? O, k = 1,..., T, be the total number of obligations to receive
 $1 at the beginning of period k which the consumer buys.
 It is clear that if the individual contracts for any of these obligations it will affect the
 amount of funds available for k th period consumption. Any Dk held, representing promises
 to receive funds, will increase consumption possibilities in period k and any Lk held,
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 representing promises to pay funds, will reduce them. For each future period total con-
 sumption will be '
 Ck = k + Dk - Lk k =1,..., T. (1)
 The consumer must take future incomes yk as given, but can affect current and future
 consumption levels by purchases and sales of deposit and loan contracts in the current
 period.
 The utility function defined over consumption levels Ck, which will not be realized
 until future periods, may be transformed into one defined over current period consumption
 plus a commitment in the current period to a financing plan that will achieve the desired
 consumption plan. A modified version of the conventional Fisherian framework is obtained
 by substituting (1) into the utility function and writing it as
 U(Co, yj + D, - L,,..., y + DT - LT). (2)
 Any particular financing plan will affect Co, the level of current period consumption, in a
 way that will be described in detail below. For now, however, it is sufficient to simply
 recognize the properties of the utility function as it is written in (2) by noting that the strict
 quasiconcavity of the utility function in the Ck, together with the linearity of (1), guarantee
 the strict quasiconcavity of (2) in Co, the Dk and the Lk. In effect, this substitution allows
 the intertemporal consumption problem to be reduced to a problem of choosing the
 current period consumption and "savings" levels, and of allocating that savings to credit
 and debt instruments.2
 Individuals face fixed current period prices pk at which they sell their obligations Lk,
 and fixed current period prices dk at which they buy others' obligations Dk. These prices
 are equivalent to "discount rates" calculated from effective single-period interest rates or
 yields applicable over the term of the credit or debt contract. If rk and 6k are the effective
 single-period interest rates on loan and deposit contracts of term k, respectively, then pk -
 1 / (1 + rk)k and dk 1/ (1 +6k)k. Since 0 < rk ( oo and 0 < 6k oo, O < pk ? 1 and O <
 dk ? i.3
 In the current period, the individual maximizes utility by choosing a level of current
 period consumption Co and an optimal combination of purchases and sales of the Dk and
 Lk to finance the (implicit) intertemporal consumption plan. That choice is constrained by
 the requirement that current period consumption, plus net expenditure on financial instru-
 ments of all maturities, not exceed initial wealth. Total outlays for deposit instruments of
 maturity k are dk Dk, and receipts for loan instruments of maturity k sold are pk Lk. Net
 current period expenditure on financial instruments of all maturities is the sum over all
 maturities of the difference between what is paid for the purchase of deposit contracts and
 what is received from the sale of loan contracts. In the current period, therefore, the
 individual must choose the level of current consumption and a financing plan whose
 present value does not exceed initial wealth:
 1. The consumption level achievable in any future period will also be affected by borrowing or lending
 undertaken in periods prior to the current one. This can be easily allowed for but will be ignored here for simplicity.
 2. The general structure of (2) is, in principle, similar to that of Morishima [6], but is less restrictive since it does
 not require the assumption of separability of the utility function between consumption and financing variables.
 3. Any loan or deposit, regardless of the particular payment terms, may be thought to consist of the current sale
 or purchase of several instruments as they are defined here, at different "long rates" 6k or rk. See Hicks [3, 145].
This content downloaded from 143.229.59.217 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 16:43:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 INDIVIDUAL WELFARE AND THE DEMAND FOR FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 119
 T
 C + [dkDk--pkLk] = w. (3) k=l
 The individual's problem is to choose non-negative values of Co, Dk and Lk to maxi-
 mize (2), subject to (3). Under the assumptions about the utility function a solution to this
 problem exists and is unique.4 It is worth emphasizing that even though the decision
 problem is cast in terms of actions taken in the current period alone, the individual is not
 constrained to make simple allocations of funds between the current and various future
 periods. By appropriate purchases and sales of financial instruments in the current period,
 intertemporal transfer of funds between any two arbitrary periods within the planning
 horizon can be achieved.
 Straightforward analogues to the usual indirect utility function and expenditure
 function can be defined which will be useful in the welfare analysis to come. Letting
 P (P . . , PT), d - (dl ,..., dT), D (D1, .. ., Dk), L (L1,..., Lk), and suppressing the
 parameters yk, the indirect utility function is defined as
 v(p, d, w) max U(Co, D1 -L1,..., DT-LT)
 s.t. C,+ d'D- p'L = w;
 Co >0, Lk - 0, Dk -O k=1,..., T. (4)
 The expenditure function, defined as the minimum "expenditure," or wealth, which is
 necessary in order to achieve a given level of utility when facing a set of prices and future
 incomes, is given by
 e(p,d,v) min Co+ d*D - p'L
 s.t. U( C, D1--L1, . . .., DT- LT) = v
 Co ; 0, Dk ? O, Lk > O k= 1,..., T. (5)
 By definition, the indirect utility function and expenditure function are related by the
 familiar identity:
 e(p, d, v(p, d, w)) w. (6)
 Some useful characteristics of individual demand behavior may be derived from
 these two functions. Application of the envelope theorem to (4) establishes the following
 derivative property of the indirect utility function.'
 --(av/pk)/(av/W) = - Lk(p, d, w) < 0
 -(1v/dk)/(nv/Iw) /= Dk(p, d, w) > 0 k= 1,..., T. (7)
 Note that the right-hand sides of (7), which depend on loan and deposit prices and wealth,
 4. Non-negativity restrictions and the linearity of the constraint equation in (3) guarantee that the constraint set
 is closed, bounded, and therefore compact. The continuity of U(-) assures that a solution exists. The convexity of the
 constraint set beneath this boundary, together with the strict quasiconcavity of the objective function, guarantee that
 the solution is unique.
 5. These derivatives exist and are well-defined as long as the consumer is not locally satiated and is at an
 interior solution in the Ck, k=O,..., T
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 120 Geoffrey A. Jehle
 are the (signed) "Fisherian" demands for loan and deposit obligations, analogous to the
 Marshallian demands for ordinary goods and services. It is crucial to notice, however, that
 these derivatives give the Fisherian demands for loan and deposit contracts in terms of
 their future values, rather than their present values.
 Similar application of the envelope theorem to (5) shows that the price partial deriva-
 tives of the expenditure function give the (signed) Hicksian, or utility-constant, demands.
 Oe/lpk = --Lk(p, d, v) < 0
 Oe/Odk = Dk(p, d, v) > 0 k=1,...,T. (8)
 It is easy to show that e (p, d, v) is concave in prices and monotonic increasing in v.
 Concavity in prices, together with (8), establish that the own-substitution effects of deposit
 and loan price changes have the expected signs.6
 III. Individual Welfare and Observable Surplus
 In this section an exact measure of the effects of deposit and loan price changes on
 individual welfare will be constructed. This measure will generally be unobservable. How-
 ever, observable measures can be specified that will approximate the theoretically correct
 measure to a high degree of accuracy. Borrower and depositor surplus concepts, analogous
 to ordinary consumer surplus, will be used for this purpose. When these surplus measures
 are properly defined, and only when so defined, arguments exactly parallel to those of
 Willig [11; 12] can be used to establish a clear relationship between observable surpluses
 and rigorous notions of individual welfare under a wide range of circumstances encountered
 in theory and practice.
 The fundamental tool for the analysis of individual welfare is the wealth-compensation
 function, A (p, dipo, do, wo), defined as the minimum current period wealth necessary at
 prices (p, d) to make the consumer just as well-off as at some base prices and wealth, (p0,
 do) and wo. Implicitly, the wealth-compensation function is defined as
 v (p, d, (p, dPO pO, do o)) v(p, do,w0) = vo. (9)
 An important property of the wealth-compensation function may be seen by differentiating
 (9) with respect to prices pk and dk, and using (7):
 P/=pk ( -(vP/Opk)/(OV/Ow) = - Lk(p, d,/I) 5 0
 a/ladk = -(avla/dk)/(Ov/w) = Dk(p,d,I) ? 0 k=1,..., T (10)
 where /p -- / (p, d i po, do,wo). The right-hand sides of (10) are, respectively, the Hicksian demands for Lk and Dk, both relative to utility level v%.
 In modern welfare theory, the "compensating variation" [3] is widely accepted as a
 proper measure of the effect on consumer welfare of an ordinary commodity price change.7
 6. That is, an increase in pk (decrease in interest rate rk) causes a substitution in favor of Lk along a given
 indifference curve, and an increase in dk (decrease in deposit rate Sk) causes a substitution out of Dk along a given
 indifference curve.
 7. There are, of course, many other such measures. However, the Hicksian compensating and equivalent
 variation are the most common. For brevity, the analysis here will focus on the compensating variation alone, though
 all important results can be derived in terms of the equivalent variation as well.
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 An analogous compensating variation in wealth, CV, may be defined here as the wealth
 adjustment which is necessary after a loan or deposit price change in order to leave the
 consumer just as well off as under the base situation. CV is defined implicitly as
 v(p, d, wo + CV) v(po, do, w0).
 The compensating variation and the wealth-compensation function are very closely related.
 In particular, wo + CV = (p, d p d, wdo o) and, of course wo A(p0, do 0p, do, wo).
 Noting the dependence of CV on the two sets of prices,
 CV(p, dp, do,wo) = (p, dlpo, do ,w)- (p, do 0, do,wo). (11)
 In view of (10), CV can be represented by a path-independent line integral of the
 gradient of the wealth-compensation function or, simply, as areas under the Hicksian
 demands for financial instruments. Using the relationshp of A(-) to CV and an important
 theorem in welfare economics, the consumer's indirect utility function may be written in
 terms of CV and the consumer's wealth. This theorem, originally due to Hurwicz and
 Uzawa [4, 119] and recalled by Willig [11, 53], shows that a demand-generating indirect
 utility function like v(-), derived from an ordinary utility function possessing the quasi-
 concavity and differentiability properties assumed in the second section above, is trans-
 formable by a strictly monotone increasing function into another demand-generating
 indirect utility function defined in terms of the wealth compensation function. Their
 findings are recalled here as Proposition 1.
 PROPOSITION 1. For v(-) as in (4) and A(-) as in (9), there exists a strictly monotone
 increasing function which transforms the individual's indirect utility function into an
 equivalent indirect utility function defined in terms of the wealth-compensation function.
 In particular, for arbitrary but fixed prices (p,d), the indirect utility function may take the
 form
 - = (p dl p, d w).
 Proof Let (p,d) be an arbitrarily chosen set of fixed prices. Given any set of prices (p,
 d) and wealth w, there exists some level of wealth which enables the individual to achieve
 the same level of utility facing (p, d) as achieved facing (p, d) and having wealth w.
 Formally, there exists some A such that
 v(p, d, A) v(p, d, w) (P.1)
 where, A~ = -(p, ~ p, d, w). Recalling the definition of the expenditure function, invoking
 (6), and using (P.1), it is clear that e(p, d, v(p, d, w) e e(~, d, v(~, d, )) = .
 Substituting for A gives
 e(p, n, v(p, d, w)) (p, Alp, d, w). (P.2)
 Since (#, d) are fixed, (P.2) is simply a specific function of (p,d) and w. By the monotonicity
 of e () in v, the 1.h.s. of (P.2) is simply a monotonic transform of the indirect utility function
 v('). As such, # (P, d1p, d, w) preserves all of the ordinal properties of the individual's preferences captured by v (p, d, w) and so may itself serve as an indirect utility function.8
 The statement of the theorem follows directly. Q.E.D.
 8. The function A(j, dip, d, w), of course, possesses all of the demand-generating properties that v (p, d, w)
 does. To verify this, differentiate the l.h.s. of (P.2) with respect to any price and wealth, then use (7).
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 This proposition constitutes a major step towards observability and measurability of
 consumer's welfare by permitting the ordinary indirect utility function, which gives an
 ordinal index of consumer welfare measured in unobservable and incomensurate "utils,"
 to be transformed into an equivalent ordinal index of consumer welfare measured in
 observable "dollar," or wealth units. A strict corollary to this proposition, originally noted
 by Willig [11, 53] for the case of ordinary commodity price changes, follows directly from
 the definition of CV in (11) and provides another important step towards observability.
 COROLLARY. At any set of prices and wealth the indirect utility function can be
 represented by a dollar-scaled index consisting of the sum of wealth and the compensating
 variation in wealth from the given prices to any arbitrary set of prices. In particular,
 S= CV(, 9llp, d, w) + w.
 Proof. Since pt (p, dip, d, w) - w, the indirect utility function in Proposition 1 can be
 rewritten as
 = [ (p, d p,d, w) - At(p, dip, d, w)] + w.
 By (11) the term in brackets is the compensating variation in wealth from (p,d) to (f,d).
 Q.E.D.
 The form of the indirect utility function given above provides a tool measured in
 observable units which can be used to directly analyze the effects on individual welfare of
 loan price changes, deposit price changes, and wealth changes. While it is defined in
 observable units, the level of this index of individual welfare cannot be directly observed.
 This is because CV, though an exact measure of the welfare effect of price changes, is not
 directly observable since it represents areas under Hicksian demands which are themselves
 not observable. A final link between CVand something that is observable is needed. That
 link can be established by direct analogy in the current intertemporal setting to Willig's
 well-known solution to the problem of estimating the compensating variation in income
 using a sequence of areas under ordinary Marshallian demands. With proper adaptation,
 the entire body of estimation results derived by Willig can be carried over to the particular
 type of intertemporal decision problem which underlies the demands for financial instru-
 ments. Using a properly defined analogue to the usual measure of multidimensional con-
 sumer surplus, CV can be expressed in terms of this observable plus an error term subject
 to bounds that can be calculated from observable market data.
 The appropriate multidimensional surplus measure for this purpose is the sum of
 areas under sequentially shifted Fisherian demands for loans and deposits, when those
 demands take their price and future value forms. For d and ' arbitrary but fixed, define
 depositor surplus, DS, and borrower surplus, BS, as
 TK1 dk
 BS X --Lk(dpl,,pk-I' 'Pk+I'''**PT, w)dg (12)
 k= 1 Pk
 and let A DS + BS. Here, A is completely analogous to the particular form of the
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 Pk 1 Lk(Pk'w) Pk
 t ABS >0
 Pk
 0
 Lk
 Figure 1.
 multidimensional surplus measure used by Willig [11, 54], and it represents the sum of
 areas under sequentially shifted Fisherian demands for loans and deposits, when those
 demands are written as functions of loan and deposit prices.9 Letting t CV - A denote
 the deviation of observable surplus from the compensating variation in wealth, the corollary
 to Proposition I permits the indirect utility function to be written as
 9 (p, d, w)- w + A + t. (13)
 To assess the welfare effect of deposit and loan price changes, only the changes in BS,
 DS, and the deviation term need be known. For example, consider the case of a single
 loan price change. Let p' > pk, and define p' (ps... , k-, , Pk+1,..., P). Letting
 T t - t' be the change in the deviation from CV, the change in welfare from the loan
 price increase from Pk to pk reduces to
 v(p', d, w) - v(p, d, w) = Lk(d,pl,.,.. Pk-l,pk Pk+1,. ,PT, w)df + T. (14) Pk
 The integral measures the (signed) change in borrower surplus. This will be positive and is
 illustrated in Figure I as the area ABS.
 In general, the results obtainable on estimating the compensating variation in wealth
 using borrower and depositor surplus are entirely analogous to those derived by Willig on
 estimating the compensating variation in income with consumer surplus. When wealth
 elasticities of the Fisherian loan and deposit demands are constant, CV can be calculated
 exactly from the observable surpluses. When wealth elasticities are non-constant, upper
 and lower bounds on the error in using BS and DS to estimate CV can be reliably
 calculated. Since Willig's results are well-known, and since all of his approximation results
 9. A has been defined in terms of a particular sequence of price changes, taking the deposit price changes first
 and then the loan price changes. Unlike CV which is the sum of path-independent integrals of Hicksian demands, the
 value of A is path-dependent and does depend on the sequence of prices chosen. The choice of different paths will not
 alter any of the general relationships between A and CV given above, but it will alter the magnitudes of A and of the
 error term, as well as the "tightness" of the bounds calculable on that error. The particular sequence of price changes
 used above was chosen arbitrarily, and is neither necessary nor optimal in any sense.
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 carry over to the present case when the proper specifications of borrower and depositor
 surplus in (12) are substituted for ordinary consumer surplus in his derivations, it will not
 be necessary to catalog all of those same results and their derivations here. The reader with
 special needs or interests in the details of these arguments is referred to Jehle [5]. For
 convenience, however, a few of the most useful results for the case of a single price change
 are reproduced here as Proposition 2, and proofs are sketched in the Appendix.
 PROPOSITION 2. Let r7 denote the wealth elasticity of the relevant Fisherian demand
 function. For the case of a change in loan price pk, 77 takes the interpretation 77
 (OLk/Ow)(w/Lk). For a change in deposit price dk, t7 (ODk/Ow)(w/Dk). Let A BS +
 DS as in (12), and define the ratio a I A I / w. Then we have the following three cases of
 interest.
 (i) Non-constant Wealth Elasticity. If wealth elasticity is non-constant over the relevant
 range, but - > 77 >_ R are upper and lower bounds on the values taken by r7 in that
 range, then the error in estimating CV with A can be bounded as follows:
 [(1 + (1- )a)"/ -)- 1-a]/a T/IA| _ [(1 + (1- -)a)'"" I- 1 - a)]/a
 for 1 + (1 -r)a > 0, 1 +(1-)a > 0, andr7 #1, # 1 .
 (ii) Constant Wealth Elasticity. If r7 is constant over the relevant range of wealth and
 price space, then CV may be calculated exactly as:
 CV = w[(l + (1 - -r)a)1'~i' - 1], -7 $ 1
 = w[exp(a)-l], 77 1.
 (iii) Rule of Thumb. When r7 is constant, or when -i and R are not too far apart, the
 percentage error in using A to approximate CV will usually be of the following rough
 order of magnitude in most applications:
 T/ IA I r7a/2.
 IV. Surplus Calculation Using Interest Rates
 The demand functions for loan and deposit instruments used above, from which the
 welfare and surplus results were derived, are defined in their price and future value forms
 in order to be able to make easy use of Willig's large body of approximation results. For
 the purpose of establishing the necessary analogies to Willig's results, this was the most
 straightforward approach to take. However, for most empirical applications, and for some
 theoretical purposes, it is usually more convenient to work with interest rates and the
 present value of loan or deposit contracts-the amounts actually borrowed or lent-
 rather than with discount rates and the future value of contracts when, for example,
 estimating demand functions and calculating surpluses. The translation into these terms is
 straightforward and should provide an easier and more intuitive approach to take in many
 cases. It will be shown, however, that borrower and depositor surplus, the proper ob-
 servable measures of individual welfare, cannot be simply interpreted as the areas under
 deposit and loan demand functions when those functions are written in terms of interest
This content downloaded from 143.229.59.217 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 16:43:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 INDIVIDUAL WELFARE AND THE DEMAND FOR FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 125
 rates. The analogies between surplus measures appropriate to demands for financial instru-
 ments and those appropriate to demands for ordinary goods and services, which have been
 drawn by Rhoades [9] and others, are thus shown to be subject to previously unrecognized
 conceptual and computational errors.
 The demand functions Lk(p, d, w) and Dk(p, d, w) are defined above as the future
 values, k periods hence, of the loan and deposit contracts sold or brought in the current
 period. Prices pk = 1 / (1 + rk)k and dk = 1 / (I + 6k)k of these contracts are the "discount
 rates" which can be applied to the demand functions to obtain the present value of the
 contracts in the current period. For r - (ri,..., rT), - (61,..., 6T), and writing Lk* and
 Dk* to indicate "present value demand functions," equations (15) give the present value of
 the contracts, or the volumes of funds actually received or given up in the current period,
 viewed as functions of interest rates.
 Lk (r, , w) k Lk(p, d,w)
 Dk*(r, , w) dkDk(p, d, w) (15)
 The interest rate forms are the most common ones which loan and deposit demands take in
 empirical and theoretical analysis. Using (15), the relationship of borrower and depositor
 surplus measures to the present value interest rate forms of these demand functions can be
 easily established.
 PROPOSITION 3. Let LF (r, 6, w) give the volume of funds demanded in the current
 period for a term of k periods at an interest rate of rk per-period, and let Dk (r, 6 w) give
 the volume offunds supplied in the current period for a term of k periods at an interest
 yield of 6k per period. Then, for ' and 9 arbitrary but fixed, the only observable surplus
 measures which bear a well-defined relationship to CV, the theoretically correct measure
 of individual welfare, are the following interest rate forms of the multi-dimensional
 borrower and depositor surpluses:
 T 5k
 DS k[Dk*(6,,...,6k-,z, k+1 ,6r, z,w)/(1 +z)]dz k=1 k
 T rk
 BS 1 k[L*(6,r,...,rk-Iz,+r~ **9T + k=1 f k k+1 9 ... , r w)l(l + z)] dz.
 Proof. The relationship of CV to DS and BS has already been established, so it will
 be sufficient to show that the interest rate forms of DS and BS above are equivalent to the
 price forms in (12). The proof consists of applying a simple change of variables theorem to
 each of the integrals in (12) and substituting from (15). Denote the kth element of BS in
 (12) by BSk and recognize the pk = g(rk) (1 + rk)-k, so that g' (rk) = - (k/(1 + rk)) g(rk).
 By (15), L (rk) g(rk) Lk(g(rk)). Performing the change of variables and substituting
 gives1o
 BSk f -Lk(()d! = -Lk(g(z))g'(z)dz = fk[L (z)/(1+z)]dz.
 Pk k
 Summing over all k establishes the claim for BS in the statemet of the proposition, and an
 identical argument establishes the claim for DS. Q.E.D.
 10. See any calculus text or [8] for a proof of the change of variables theorem.
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 / D (81 w)/(1 + 1)
 /B
 61 
 D DD* /(1+81) I 'D
 Figure 2.
 Borrower and depositor surplus, calculated as in Proposition 3 from the usual interest
 rate forms of loan and deposit demand functions, are directly substitutable for BS and DS
 in Proposition 2. All results relating these surpluses to CV and individual welfare remain
 unchanged when this method of calculation is used."
 It is important to notice that DS and BS are not simply equal to the areas between
 two interest rate levels underneath the interest rate forms of the observable Fisherian loan
 and deposit demand functions. The correct surplus measures are those areas "scaled" by
 the maturity of the loan or deposit in terms of the number of standard periods, k, and
 "discounted" over the range of integration by the factor (1 + z)-'. The intuition of this is
 perhaps clearest in the case of single-period lending represented in Figure 2.
 In Figure 2, the single-period deposit rate 6, is graphed against the amount of funds
 supplied in the current period, D*, and the discounted transformation DF / (1 + 61). The
 area C can be thought of heuristically as approximating the minimum interest income that
 must accrue to the depositor over the period in order to induce him to supply the amount
 D* at the beginning of the period. The total of the areas A, B and C is the amount of
 interest income that actually does accrue to the depositor over the period. The excess of
 what is received over what is minimally necessary -areas A + B, or the simple surplus -
 measures a sort of surplus in income that the depositor holder receives over the period.
 This income, however, is not paid to the individual until the end of the period. The
 compensating variation in wealth, on the other hand, measures the adjustment in wealth
 the individual requires at the beginning of the period to make him just as well off (in this
 case) holding no deposits as he would be holding D* paying 6i over the period. In effect,
 the area A + B measures the sum of (infinitely small) incremental income surpluses which
 will not be paid until the end of the period. They must, therefore, be "discounted" to
 11. Notice also that the wealth elasticities calculated from the future value forms Lk and Dk and used in the
 bounding process in Proposition 2 are equal to the wealth elasticities calculated directly from the interest rate forms L*
 and Dk*. Taking loan demand for illustration and letting 7r -- ( Lk/dW)/ (w/Lk), it is clear from (15) that (Lk* l/w)/
 (w/Lk*) = pk (dLk/dW) (W/pk Lk) = 77.
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 beginning-of-period values by the discount factor in Proposition 3 over the relevant range
 of interest rate values in order to conform with the proper ex ante measure of compensating
 variation. This discounted area, the proper measure of depositor surplus, is equal to the
 area A and will always be less than the simple surplus area A + B in the single-period case.
 A similar interpretation holds for the case of borrower surplus.
 It should be emphasized that casual use of simple areas under loan and deposit
 demand functions to estimate welfare effects of interest rate changes can lead to serious
 errors and result in spurious welfare inferences. It is easily shown that such simple calcula-
 tions will sometimes overestimate and sometimes underestimate the proper BS and DS
 measures, depending on the term of the loan or deposit and the upper and lower interest
 rate levels over the range of integration. For the commonly applied special case of single
 period borrowing or lending, however, the simple surplus calculation will always over-
 estimate the proper BS and DS measures, as Figure 2 reveals. Proposition 4 gives a
 convenient characterization of the general relationship between interest rate levels, term,
 and the extent of the error made when using simple surpluses, instead of borrower or
 depositor surplus, for arbitrary loan and deposit demand functions.
 PROPOSITION 4. Define the simple surplus under the demand curve for a loan of
 maturity k as
 SS fr L* (z) dz, Jro
 and the simple surplus under the demand for deposits of maturity k as
 SS D * (z) dz.
 Define the errors E BS - SS and E DS - SS.
 (i) If r' > ro, then k/(1 + r') - 1 E/ISSI ? k/(1 + ro) - 1.
 (ii) If6' > 60, then k/(1 +6') - 1 ? E/I|SSI ? k/(1 +60) - 1.
 Proof. (Only (i) will be proven since the proof for (ii) is identical.) Notice that the error
 E can be written as the integral of the product of two functions
 E = L*(z)(k/(1 + z) - 1) dz
 r0
 where L*(z) ? O and k/(l + r') - 1 ? k/(l + z) - 1 ? k/(1 + ro) - 1 for ro <_z
 r'. Integrals of the product of two such functions can be bounded as follows [8, 553]:
 r') -- 1) L*(z)dz L*(z)(k/(1 + z) - 1)dz (k/(1 ro) 1) L* (z) dz.
 Substituting BS and DS from Proposition 3, SS from the definitions above and rearranging
 establishes the claim. Q.E.D.
 Taking the case of loan demand and borrower surplus as an example, some illustrative
 calculations based on Proposition 4 are presented in Table I. The entries in each of the last
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 Table I. Minimum Deviation E = BS - SS as a Proportion of SS
 Increase E/ SSI >
 r0 (% ofro) r' k = 1 k = 2 k = 5
 .05 1% .0505 -.048 .904 3.760
 5% .0525 -.050 .901 3.751
 10% .0550 -.052 .896 3.739
 20% .0600 -.057 .887 3.717
 .10 1% .1010 -.092 .817 3.541
 5% .1050 -.095 .810 3.525
 10% .1100 -.099 .802 3.505
 .15 1% .1515 -.132 .737 3.342
 5% .1575 -.136 .728 3.320
 10% .1650 -.142 .717 3.292
 three columns of the table give the minimum error as a proportion of the simple surplus
 area (E/ I SSI ) for loan rate increases ranging from 1% to 20% of various base interest rate
 levels between .05 and .20, for loans of a given maturity, k. These calculations show quite
 clearly how unreliable the simple surplus areas are as indicators of the welfare effects of
 interest rate changes. If the observed demand function is for a loan instrument with a term
 of one period, Proposition 4 shows that the simple surplus will always over-estimate the
 welfare effect of an interest rate change and, for the examples given in Table I, that
 overestimate may range from as little as 4.8% to as much as 14.2% of the calculated
 surplus, depending on the base interest rate and the extent of the rate change. If, however,
 the observed loan demand function is for a loan instrument with a maturity of at least two
 periods then, in the examples given, the simple surplus will often under-estimate the true
 welfare effect of the rate change to the extent of several hundred percent of the calculated
 surplus. These are errors which must be considered important in any serious attempt at the
 measurement of the welfare incidence of interest rate changes.
 V. Welfare Costs of Bank Mergers
 This section will briefly describe how the welfare methods just presented can be applied in
 practice to contribute to the design of rational and equitable public policy towards bank
 mergers. Bank merger policy is an important area of concern to agencies such as the FDIC,
 the Federal Reserve, and the Justice Department, which are responsible for regulating the
 banking industry. The results obtained below challenge the conventional wisdom among
 bank regulators that mergers which cause large changes in concentration are prima facie
 socially undesirable.
 The qualitative aspects of bank mergers are well-known in the literature. Standard
 Chamberlinian analysis of the relationship between market structure, firm conduct, and
 market "performance" in monopolistically competitive banking markets suggests that bank
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 mergers, insofar as they lead to increased banking concentration, can be expected to result
 in higher market loan rates and lower market deposit rates. Many empirical studies have
 tested this basic hypothesis and have estimated the relationship between loan and deposit
 rate levels and measures of market concentration.12 While such calculations abound in the
 literature, for illustrative purposes here the results of Heggestad and Mingo [2] can be
 taken to represent a reasonable consensus in this literature. They estimate that an increase
 of 1.98 basis points in the loan rate and a decrease of .27 basis points in the deposit rate
 can be anticipated for every 100 basis points increase in the Herfindhal, H = Isi2, where
 0 ? s1 ? 1 is the market share of bank i, and the index runs over all banks in the relevant
 market. A merger between banks i and j, having market shares si and sj, will cause a
 change in the Herfindhal of A H = 2 si sj > 0. If the pre-merger market interest rates are ro
 and 60, then the expected post-merger interest rates will be r' =ro + (1.98) (2 sisj) > ro and
 6' = (60 - .27 (2 sisj) < 60. The larger the market shares of the merging banks, therefore,
 the larger the change in concentration with merger and the larger the change in interest
 rates expected. It is therefore generally believed that a merger which "significantly" in-
 creases concentation will tend to have "significantly" adverse effects on borrowers and
 depositors.
 To apply such rules of thumb based on market shares and changes in concentration
 when evaluating merger proposals is subject to a number of a priori objections. For one, a
 merger causing a given change in concentration and a given change in interest rates should
 be expected to have very different effects on welfare depending on the depth and elasticity
 of demand in the relevant market, as well as on the absolute level of interest rates prevailing
 at the time of the merger. Simple market-share rules fail to capture these important
 influences.
 Building on the results of the Structure-Performance (SP) literature, borrower and
 depositor surplus techniques can be used to calculate dollar-figure estimates of the welfare
 losses likely to be suffered by borrowers and depositors as a result of a particular bank
 merger in a given market. The method is straightforward. First, estimates of the relevant
 market-level loan and deposit demand functions can be made from historical data on
 market interest rates, income, and other economic and demographic data. Then, the
 expected interest rate changes can be calculated using the estimated relationships between
 interest rate levels and measures of market concentration from the SP literature. The
 welfare costs to borrowers and depositors can then be approximated by the changes in
 borrower and depositor surplus.
 Elsewhere, this technique has been used to calculate borrower and depositor welfare
 losses in a sample of 28 merger cases considered by the FDIC over the period 1970-79.
 Assuming for simplicity that all loans and deposits had a term of one period, pooled
 cross-section and time series data were used to estimate representative per-capita demands
 for loans and deposits. The 28 market-level demands were then obtained by evaluating
 these estimated functions at the values of the independent variables obtaining in each
 market at the time of the proposed merger.13
 12. See Rhoades [9] for an excellent survey of this literature.
 13. The estimated demand equations are
 log(L*) = 3.67 - .8571og(LIR) + 1.09log(INC) + .2251og(UR), R2 = .68
 (5.11) (-2.10) (4.68) (2.97)
This content downloaded from 143.229.59.217 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 16:43:24 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 130 Geoffrey A. Jehle
 The market shares of the merging banks in the sample produced changes in market
 concentration measured by the Herfindhal ranging from 2 to 1,106 basis points. Estimates
 of the post-merger interest rate levels were calculated as described earlier using the results
 of Heggestad and Mingo, and estimates of the welfare costs of the mergers in the sample
 were computed using Proposition 3. Welfare costs varied considerably over the mergers in
 the sample, and these calculations are reported in Table II. In all cases, borrower and
 depositor surplus changes provided accurate estimates of the welfare effects of the mergers
 on borrowers and depositors. Using the bounding procedure in Proposition 2, it was found
 that the errors made in using the observable surplus measures to approximate the true
 welfare changes were negligible, and in no case exceeded a few tenths of one percent of the
 calculated surplus. Per-capita borrower surplus losses ranged from $.01 to $23.33, and
 per-capita depositor surplus losses ranged from $.002 to $4.67. The mergers in the sample
 gave rise to a mean cost of $.89 per-capita for depositors and $5.61 per-capita for
 borrowers.
 A simple F-test was applied to the data in Table II to test the null hypotheses that
 there is no correlation between changes in borrower surplus and changes in concentration,
 and no correlation between changes in depositor surplus and changes in concentration.
 The calculated F-statistics in the two cases were .138 and .388, respectively, Both are less
 than the critical value of 1.38, and so the null hypotheses that there is no correlation
 between changes in concentration and changes in either borrower or depositor welfare
 cannot be rejected at the 25% significance level.
 While rough and imperfect in ways, these simple calculations are nonetheless sugges-
 tive. They cast doubt on the conventional wisdom relating market shares and changes in
 concentration to the expected welfare losses from bank mergers, and they direct attention
 to the importance of the market interest rate level and the depth and elasticity of demand
 in determining the welfare impact of particular mergers in particular markets. The impor-
 tance of these factors illustrates the advantages of borrower and depositor surplus methods
 over traditional methods of merger analysis. First, they provide observable and accurate in-
 dices of welfare change which bear a well-defined relation to accepted theoretical measures
 of welfare. Second, they provide a means of gauging welfare costs which is sensitive to
 market-specific characteristics of the particular banking market being considered. Finally,
 by providing dollar estimates of the welfare costs of mergers to depositors and to borrowers,
 these techniques permit a more careful weighing of the costs of a merger against its
 benefits, and they help give policy-makers greater insight into the distributional conse-
 quences of their decisions.
 VI. Conclusion
 Building from a standard Fisherian intertemporal consumption model, this paper has
 shown how exact measures of the relationship between individual welfare and discount
 D* = 2.85 + 135.41DIR + 186.75 INC, R 2 = .73.
 (.987) (2.60) (2.64)
 Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, LIR is the loan interest rate, DIR the deposit interest rate, INC is per-capita
 income, UR is the unemployment rate. See [5] for a complete description of the data and methods used in the
 estimation and surplus calculations.
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 Table II. Per-Capita Welfare Loss in 28 FDIC Bank Merger Cases, 1970-79
 Market AH* ABS ADS
 1 0.454 1.20 0.200
 2 0.238 1.04 0.130
 3 0.277 3.23 0.760
 4 1.829 5.76 1.460
 5 3.276 1.30 0.190
 6 0.390 9.65 1.860
 7 3.640 5.15 0.710
 8 1.667 0.42 0.060
 9 5.263 13.10 2.290
 10 0.130 6.70 0.920
 11 2.122 10.43 1.710
 12 4.424 6.30 1.080
 13 2.563 7.26 1.010
 14 2.400 20.74 0.820
 15 2.088 3.44 0.600
 16 4.558 2.42 0.370
 17 1.315 10.80 1.680
 18 0.762 6.82 1.000
 19 3.360 0.07 0.010
 20 0.554 23.33 4.670
 21 2.318 0.17 0.030
 22 0.020 2.49 0.510
 23 0.432 1.59 0.310
 24 11.060 1.33 0.220
 25 0.075 0.24 0.040
 26 1.240 0.03 0.002
 27 0.794 0.01 0.002
 28 0.543 15.76 3.150
 * Hundreds of basis points.
 rates or interest rates on financial instruments can be constructed. It was shown that, with
 proper adaptation and proper accounting for the role of time in the decision to borrow or
 lend, methods identical to those of Willig can be applied to measure the welfare effects of
 interest rate changes with a high degree of accuracy, using observable market data.
 For the purpose of social welfare analysis, it is a straightforward matter to construct
 flexible Bergsonian social welfare functions from the individual's indirect utility function
 given in the corollary to Proposition 1, or in (13), with no more than the usual difficulties
 encountered in aggregation. Adopting the social welfare function approach to such prob-
 lems as banking market structure analysis, in conjunction with the approximation and
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 computational results in Propositions 2 and 3, enables the analyst to make empirical
 measurements of the costs and benefits of different policies, to weigh them against each
 other, and to arrive at a net social decision which has an unambiguous welfare theoretic
 justification. 14
 An important question which has not been addressed here, but which bears further
 careful research, is the extent to which the theoretical and computational results derived in
 the Fisherian case of perfect certainty apply in a model of individual demands for financial
 instruments which emphasizes the role of uncertainty.
 14. For a fuller treatment of these issues in general, and in the kind of spatial market analysis typical in banking,
 see [5].
 Appendix
 The purpose of this appendix is to prove Proposition 2 and to give more detail to the precise
 relationship between observable measures of depositor and borrower surplus and the compensating
 variation in wealth. All results and methods of derivation follow exactly, by analogy, those of Willig
 [11; 12]. No effort is made to reproduce the considerable body of approximation results reported by
 Willig. Instead, the purpose here is to sketch the basic argument and to acquaint the reader having
 more specific needs with the modifications which will be necessary to interpret Willig's results in the
 context of demands for financial instruments. Terms have been defined consistently so that the
 reader may refer directly to Willig's larger body of results, without the need to translate notation.
 Finally, for simplicity in the exposition here, only the case of single price changes for an individual
 will be treated. Proofs and more extended arguments for cases of multiple price changes and
 aggregation are provided in [5].
 Consider first the effect on individual welfare of a single loan-price change from p k to pk' for
 instrument Lk(p, d, wo) given base wealth wo. Let p0 (p0..., pO) and p' (p0 ... .. ...P).
 Define CV and A as in (11) and (12). Let r7 and ij be lower and upper bounds, respectively, on the
 wealth elasticity of loan demand, (OLk/Ow)(w/Lk), over the relevant region of price-wealth space.
 Finally, notice that for any w2 > w1, the Mean Value Theorem gives,
 [w2/W1]' ?] Lk(p,w2)/Lk(p,wl) - [w2/WII. (Al) For the case of a loan-price decrease (loan interest rate increase), pk < p,, so by (10) and (12),
 IA(p'Ip0, wo) > I (p0 p?, w?) - wO and
 CV = 1 (p' I P,w) - 1A(p I0 ,w0) > 0
 A = BS = -Lk(P? *..... Pk-,9, Pk+1 * ... PT, w0)d > 0. (A2)
 For {pl p = tp + (1 - t)p'; 0 t 1},letting w2 (pIp?, w0)- (p) and w, = (p) = wo, (Al) gives
 [E (p)/wo) < Lk(p, (p))/Lk(pw?) < ( 0 (p)/w?). (A3)
 Rearrangement and substitution of --l/a/pk for Lk(p, 4(p)) by (10) gives
 "o*Lk( p _ -k -(a/-pk)[ (pll-/(1 - 4)] and,
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 0-
 (a/ apk)[(p)l-/(Wo . Lk(p, W?).
 Integrating both sides of these two inequalities from pk' to pO preserves the inequalities. Rearranging
 terms gives,
 w0[1 + (1 --r) A/wo]I/(I-T) (p') ? w?[1 + (1 - ) A/w?]/-0 (A4)
 for 1 + (1 - 7)A/ w >0 and 1 + (1 - ) A/ w >0;and : 1, _ : 1. For T CV - A, and given (A2), the error incurred in using A instead of CV measured as a
 proportion of the absolute value of the surplus, T/ I Al, is obtained directly from (A4). Letting a
 IAl /w, the bounds on this error may be written
 [(1 + (1- /0)a)/(-)- 1 - a]/a ? T/IAI : [(1 + (1- -)aa) /77 - 1 - a]/a (A5)
 which establishes the claim in Proposition 2(i).
 The case of a deposit-price increase (deposit interest rate decrease) can be treated similarly. For
 d' = (dog.../ dk' ... d) and do (do...,dk,..., d), where dk' > dk, by (10) dl/Idk > 0 so
 S(d'idowo) > (do do 0w)w. Letting 1(d'Id0, w) W2 and 1(doIdo, wo)= w,, using (Al) gives
 (A4) and (A5) again, where
 A - DS = Dk (d,..., dk-, , d+... d, wo) d > 0.
 Consideration of loan-price increases (loan interest rate decreases) from pO to p', and deposit-
 price decreases (deposit interest rate increases) from do to d', lead, by a parallel derivation, to (A4)
 and (A5) also. However, in these cases, (12) shows that BS, DS and A will be negative.
 In the limit, as r7 approaches -7, (A4) shows that the compensating variation in wealth may be
 expressed exactly as a function of the surplus A. When 7 = - = r # 1 is constant over the relevant
 range, (A4) gives
 1A(p'pdo, wd) = w0[1 + (1 --7) A/wwo]/I -")
 and since 1A(p01 p0, wo 0 w0, by (A2)
 CV ' wo([1 + (1 --7)A/wo]1/(-n) - 1), (A6)
 which proves Proposition 2(ii).
 This exact relationship between the compensating variation and the observable surpluses when
 the wealth elasticity is constant gives rise to the final approximation result, Proposition 2(iii), which
 is simpler and which may be useful when r7 is constant or when 7- and 77 are not too far apart. The
 proof consists of applying the Taylor approximation (1 + t)l(/-'7'7) 1 + t/(1 - I7) + rt2/2(1 - -7)2
 to (A6) and rearranging to obtain
 T/I AI |, ra/2. (A7)
 Willig [12] has compiled a table of numerical values for the bounds on Tas a percent of A as
 given in Proposition 2(i) and (iii). Notation has been defined so that the reader may refer directly to
 those calculations.
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